WTI testemony from Iraq: Ghazwan Al-Mukhtar Baghdad, occupied Iraq

Honorable members of the international criminal tribunal Iraq, ladies and gentlemen.

It is really an honor for me to able to address such a distinguished gathering to give my views and observations on what is happening in Iraq. My witness testimony is based on the fact that I lived most of my 60 years in Iraq. I have been, for the last twelve years, active in the anti sanctions and anti war movement in Iraq. I devoted a lot of my time talking and exchanging ideas with foreign activist visiting Iraq. The war of 1991 forced me to close my engineering business and forced me to give my self an early retirement. I pride my self as an independent thinker with no connection to any political party in power.

The gulf war of 1991 was only the first phase of the on going war between America and Iraq. It was according to American secretary of states Mr. James Baker to drive Iraq to the pre-industrial age which America nearly did. The draconian sanctions that followed were imposed on Iraq for nearly 13 years was the second phase. This phase of hostility had disastrous effects on the civilian population of Iraq. I am sure that the majority of the participants have some idea but I could tell you that it was a true genocide. Lies and misinformation were used to justify the illegal war and the occupation of Iraq. This phase of the war, with no end in sight, is the most devastating phase of the ongoing war between America and Iraq.

In order to measure the effects of the ongoing wars one has to find a base point of comparison. I claim that this base point or reference point should be the conditions in Iraq that existed in 1990 before the first phase of war. I will endeavor to use unbiased figures, mostly from UN document if possible, to compare the condition that existed in or about 1990 with the current conditions in Iraq. I think that this “yardstick” will give us an indication of how good or how bad the current conditions are compared to the condition prior to the war in 1991.

I will not try to proportionate the blame between Saddam and America for the ills that happened to us, the Iraqi people, since I believe the civilized world should not have turned the blind eye to the blight of the Iraqi people just because the ills were done by Saddam. Probably the civilized world is more guilty than Saddam because Saddam was a known dictator long before the war stated in 1991. Some of those civilized and bleeding hearts were in Baghdad meeting Saddam, shaking his hand and later on supported him in his war against Iran. They totally disregarded Saddam’s human right abuse for their political gains. I am sure you know that I am referring to the visit in 1983 and 1984 by non other than Donald Rumsfield who aligned his country, the USA, to a dictator like Saddam.

During my testimony I will discus few important sectors highlighting the conditions in 1990 and conditions now.

The Human Cost of the War


It is very hard to know the exact human cost of the occupation of Iraq.  The U.S. military refuses to monitor or even estimate the number of Iraqi civilian casualties. Gen. Tommy Franks says,  “We don’t do body counts.” [1]   Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, Deputy Director of Operations for the U.S. Military, said U.S. forces do not have the capacity to track Iraqi civilian casualties.[2] According to the Associated Press, the American-appointed Iraqi Minister of Health  “has ordered a halt to a count of civilians killed during the war and told its statistics department not to release figures compiled so far.”  The official who oversaw the count provided this information.[3]

Iraq Body Count, a group of academics and researchers, has compiled a comprehensive account of civilian casualties during the war. IBC researchers have determined that as of June 16, 2004, somewhere between 9,436 and 11,317 civilians have been killed as a direct result of the U.S. invasion and ensuing occupation of Iraq.[4]

Data from past wars shows us that the number of wounded in war is about three times as many killed.  This means that approximately 35,000 Iraqis may have been wounded as of June 2004. However, Iraq’s hospitals and health system have been understaffed and overwhelmed throughout the war, meaning that the actual number could be even higher. Medact, an organization dedicated to alleviating the health effects of war, estimates that at least 40,000 Iraqis have been injured.[5]

During “major combat” operations, between 4,895 and 6,370 Iraqi soldiers and

insurgents were killed.[6] The nature of the fighting has made it difficult to distinguish civilians from fighters. The Pentagon provides day-to-day estimates of insurgent deaths, but Iraqis on the ground claim that occupying forces unfairly categorize civilians as insurgents. For example, during the spring 2004 siege of Fallujah, over 600 Iraqis were killed. Rahul Mahajan, a journalist reporting from Fallujah during that period, estimated that the dead included 100 children and 200 women.[7] However, the U.S. commander of the operation, without visiting any hospitals or cemeteries, insisted that of the 600 killed, “95 percent of those were military age males”.[8]

Security and Police Force

On October 20, 2002, the Iraqi government issued an order that  “all prisoners be released, including non-Iraqi Arabs”.  All the prisoners included criminal elements, for example, murderers who “were being freed on the condition that they make restitution to victims' families -- including financial compensation -- within one month”.[9]

With effective police force and other security services, the crime rate did not substantially increase during the period between October 2002 and April 2003.

The significant increase in crime began after the fall of Baghdad.  At that time, criminal elements of the society went on a rampage throughout the city, looting and burning government offices, factories, hospitals, museums, art galleries, and private property. Instead of upholding law and order and preventing the looting, as required by international law, the occupation authorities have encouraged it. US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld justified the criminal acts, saying that the looting was "part of the price" for what the United States and Britain have called “ the liberation of Iraq”. Rumsfeld made this comment: "Freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things."[10] His comment serves to highlight the attitude of the occupation authorities. 

One of the first acts of the occupation authority was to dissolve the army and the police forces at a time when the country needed them most. The occupation forces did not attempt to stop these chaotic situations. In fact, there are reports that the US occupation forces encouraged these criminal activities.

After about two months of near total chaos, the occupation authorities created a new police force. This new police force depended mostly on new recruits and a few experienced former police officers. Police officers who were in service before the occupation were seen to be unfit for the “new” force because of their association with the old regime. This policy deprived the police force of the experience of very highly qualified police officers.

Gradually, police stations, staffed by a few police officers, were reopened.  However, the same buildings were used to house American soldiers. Of course using the same buildings enforced the image of the “new” Iraqi police as an extension of the American forces. Understaffed, untrained, unequipped and lightly armed:  Police stations are places where crimes are reported, but no one at the police station is likely to follow the complaint. 

There are many reasons why crimes of all sort increased:  the amnesty, general anarchy, abundance of firearms, and the lack of a functioning police force. The non-functioning telephone system and lack of electricity, which turned Baghdad into a city in darkness, also contributed to the increase in crimes. 

Criminal acts such as murder, rape, carjacking, and kidnapping have skyrocketed since March 2003, forcing children to stay home from school and women to stay off the streets at night.[11]    

Although comprehensive crime statistics are not available, Baghdad’s central morgue documented a dramatic increase in gunshot deaths; there were 10 in July 2002 and 470 in July 2003, an indicator of Iraq’s new lawlessness.[12] During the first year of occupation, there were over 4,279 violent deaths in Baghdad, averaging 357 violent deaths each month, not counting victims of car bombs or military actions. By contrast, the 2002 average was 14 deaths each month.[13]

Although the CPA has recruited approximately 200,000 Iraqi army, police and civil defence troops, they have largely failed to provide security for the Iraqi people. Many Iraqi police have refused to work with coalition forces, citing a lack of preparation, equipment, and respect from U.S. troops. Many police officers claim that U.S. troops are unwilling to cooperate with Iraqis in fighting crime.[14]

The new Iraqi police force lacks qualified officers and necessary equipment.  This means that the police force is not able to provide adequate protection to the civilian population. As of March 28, 2004, data from the Provost Marshal’s Office of the CPA indicate the following:  the Iraqi Police Service was operating with 41 percent of its required patrol vehicles, 63 percent of its required uniforms, 43 percent of its required pistols, 21 percent of its required hand radios, 7 percent of its required vehicle radios, and 9 percent of its required protective vests.[15]

The lack of progress to combat crimes and its disastrous effects on the civilian population of Iraq has resulted in the killing of many thousands of innocent lives. Let us be very clear about what this means:  the occupation authorities did NOT fulfill their international, legally binding obligation to protect the lives of the population.  U.S. Major General Paul D. Eaton, formerly in charge of training Iraqi police and military forces, admitted to the Associated Press that the effort to develop effective leadership within Iraqi security forces “hasn’t gone well. We’ve had almost one year of no progress.”[16]

Electricity Sector

In 1990 the installed electrical generating capacity of Iraq was about 9000 Mw per hour of electricity.[17]  At the end of the war 1991 the International Study Team (Harvard team) reported as follows:

Thirteen of Iraq's 20 power stations had been damaged or destroyed during the first days of allied bombing.  By the end of the bombing, there were only two stations that were still in operation; these two stations managed to produce 4% of Iraq's pre-war output. By May 1991, repairs were undertaken by cannibalizing spare parts from other plants.  By August of that year the system was back to two thirds of its 1990 peak output. Problems remained: Without the imported supplies required for proper repairs, these improvements in output were likely to be temporary and likely to pose increased safety risks.[18]

This American report shows that in the four-month period following the war, Iraqi engineers were able to restore more than 60% of the generating capacity. This improvement was accomplished despite the war, the sanctions, and the lack of spare parts.  There was no outside help for these engineers. 

Then what happened? The US used its political power at the UN to put obstacles in the way of further improvement. Specifically, the UN 661 Committee put many important and badly needed supplies and equipment on hold. In November 2001, the UNDP[1] reported the following facts to the United Nations Security Council: Out of $3,370 million allocated for electricity (phase I to X), $1,050.1 million, or 31%, were put on hold. On hold items included equipment, pumps, compressors and rotary equipment, water treatment chemicals and equipment, transmission equipment…” These items were needed to rehabilitate the system.

In his briefing to the Security Council, November 17, Benon Sevan, the Executive Director of the UN Iraq Programme commented on the holds on electrical contracts:  He repeated the UNDP's estimate that "Iraq could potentially achieve a 50 per cent increase in electricity supply if these holds were released. …We all share the view that there is a direct link between reliable power generation and the provision of health care, water supplies and other basic services."[19]

The UNDP report also stated that the actual generation of electricity in November 2001, was about 38% of the installed capacity. The drought at that time certainly contributed to this low figure. 

August 4, 2003, the Baghdad Bulletin[1] [1] quoted an Iraqi power plant manager, who indicated that the prewar production was 5000 Mw. 

Now let’s compare Iraqi progress with US progress:  After 14 months of occupation, $1.4 billion spending, access to international experts, no sanctions, and no limitations on imports, one would expect the electricity service to improve. Not so! The US Congressional Report[1]about 4,200 megawatts on June 1, 2004”.  This number is LESS than even the lowest figure quoted for prewar production. The report went on to say:

“However, electrical service in the country as a whole has not shown a marked improvement over the immediate postwar levels of May 2003 and has worsened in some governorates. For example, in May 2003, 7 of Iraq’s 18 governorates had 16 or more hours of electricity a day, but as of late May 2004, only one governorate in northern Iraq was at that level.”

So let’s compare: In a matter of four months in 1991, Iraqi engineers, working under severe UN sanctions and with limited resources and limited spare parts, were able to increase the production of electricity from 4% to 67%. In 2004, after 14 months of occupation, huge American companies, with virtually unlimited resources, have NOT significantly increased the production of electricity.  This is totally unacceptable. 

Food Security

During the 1980s Iraq had one of the highest levels of per capita food availability in the Middle East. Calorie availability data from FAO food balance sheets show an increase from 1,958 kcal in 1961 to approximately 3,200 kcal during 1984 – 1990. The latter figure exceeds the estimated average caloric requirement of the Iraqi population of 2,250 kcal per person/day.

Dietary habits and preferences included consumption of large quantities and varieties of meat, as well as chicken, pulses, grains, vegetables, fruits and dairy products. Common diets are believed to have had ample levels of most nutrients; in fact, the rate of obesity was on the increase.

Food items not produced locally were widely available and sold at subsidized price by the Government of Iraq (GOI).

Production and importation of food declined rapidly in 1990 when comprehensive

trade sanctions drastically reduced the country’s purchasing power.  The trade sanctions had several negative effects: increase in the inflation rate (the price of food soared), and  an increase in the rate of unemployment.   Existing salaries and benefits did not reflect the inflation rate.  Poverty became widespread.

The previous diet became unattainable for most Iraqis. Deprivation changed the

food habits of most people. Rationing further influenced these habits. In an attempt to address the food security crisis, GOI re-introduced a public food rationing system in September 1990. GOI rationed wheat flour, rice, sugar, vegetable oil, lentils, tea, and milk powder. The composition of the ration over 1990-1997 changed several times, reflecting GOI’s declining financial capacity to provide food for its population.

The availability of food increased in successive phases of the Oil for Food Programme, providing, on average, 2,000 -2200 kcal per person.

Routine distribution of food on this scale is in itself a massive logistic operation that appears to work flawlessly. Some 24 million people (20.5 million in the south/centre and 3.5 million in northern Iraq), or roughly 3.7 million families currently receive an average of 2,230 kcal per person per day (kcal/p/d).

Since 1997, 60% of households interviewed in Iraq were totally dependant on the ration system and reported that rations lasted less than 20 days. Iodized salt, pulses and rice are depleted the fastest, while sugar and wheat flour last the longest.

As Iraqis used to have much greater access to higher quantities and quality of food, cultural patterns of food preference and eating habits likely influence the acceptability of current diets. In order to make an assessment of the Oil for Food Programme, we would need to look at the Programme in a broader context.



There are an estimated five million Iraqis who are unemployed.[20]  The current unemployment rate is 60% of the total population, compared to 30% before the war.[21]. This rapid increase in unemployment is largely the result of the CPA’s  “de-Ba’athification” campaign, meaning the decision to disband Iraq’s military and dismantle much of Iraq’s state bureaucracy. This put 750,000 people out of work.[22] This high level of unemployment fueled the insurgency by putting “too many angry young men, with no hope for the future, on the street”. [23]

The American Appointed minister of Labor identified the following groups that need employment or social assistance: [24]

o       Demobilized Conscript Soldiers:  300,000

o       Demobilized Career Soldiers:  250,000

o       Refugees:  130,000

o       Internally Displaced Persons:  70,000

o       Unemployed:  2,500,000

o       New Labor Entrants:  375,000

o       Displaced SOE Employees:  200,000

o       Widows, Divorcees and Female-Headed Households:  400,000

o       Handicapped:  350,000.

Fewer than 25,000 Iraqis are working on projects in the U.S. reconstruction efforts. In fact the Bush administration concedes that less than one percent of Iraq’s workforce of seven million is currently involved in the reconstruction process.161. Most of Iraq’s reconstruction has been contracted out to American companies, rather than Iraqi or regional companies.[25]  This practice helps to maintain Iraq’s high unemployment rate.  Obviously, this has a disastrous impact on Iraq’s economy.

To make matters worse, the work to date has proceeded far too slowly, AND it is extremely expensive, but of substandard quality. 

After 15 months of occupation hundreds of government buildings are still destroyed. We Iraqis see NO visible sign of ongoing work on these buildings.   Local contractors and government contracting companies are capable and qualified to do the reconstruction work. Money for these reconstruction projects is available. As of June 22, the CPA used  “less than 2 percent of the reconstruction money lawmakers provided. The funds were meant to finance everything from training Iraqi police to starting small businesses to rebuilding the country's electric, water, health and oil production facilities”.[26]

The need is there, the manpower is there, the material is there, and the money is there.  However, the will and the decision to start the reconstruction AND hence reduce the unemployment are, regrettably, not there. Unemployment will continue to be above 50% until and unless meaningful and honest efforts are made to carry out the reconstruction.

Health sector

The best, the most reliable, and the most comprehensive report on the health condition in Iraq (1990-2002) was published by the United Nations Humanitarian Coordination For Iraq, Health Coordination Group (HCG)[27], Selected Health Information on Iraq, March 2003. The HCG report painted the following picture:

Before August 1990, the health care system in Iraq was based on an extensive and developed network of primary, secondary and tertiary health care facilities. These facilities were linked among themselves and with the community by a large fleet of ambulances and service vehicles, and by a good communications network facilitating referral to the next level of the health care system. It was estimated by the Government of Iraq (GOI) that 97% and 79% of the urban and rural populations, respectively, had access to health care. While the system tended to emphasize curative aspects, it was complemented by a set of public health activities that included, among others, malaria control, an expanded programme of immunizations (EPI) and tuberculosis control activities.

After 1990, the situation of the health care system changed drastically. The Gulf War, followed by more than 10 years of sanctions has resulted in significant damage to the health care network. Because of the current situation, the health facilities are dealing with a severe shortage of critically needed items and supplies. Environmental problems, reported malnutrition and difficult socioeconomic conditions have seriously aggravated this health situation.

In 1997, it was estimated that only one quarter of the medical equipment available in health care facilities was operational. By 1997, major surgical interventions were reduced to 30 - 35 % of pre-sanctions levels because of an acute shortage of anesthetics and surgical equipment and supplies. Laboratory services had declined to about 40% of pre-sanctions levels due to a lack of equipment, chemicals and reagents.

The years 1991 – 1997, between the onset of sanctions and the implementation of the humanitarian programme financed by Security Council Resolution (SCR) 986 of 1995 appear to have damaged the information services, the warehousing facilities, some of the testing facilities and communications facilities which supported distribution of medicines.

Before SCR 986, there was a general lack of anesthetics and disposable equipment (gloves, syringes and catheters). Published reports on health in Iraq during the 1990’s describe alarming increases in malnutrition and rising rates of immunization preventable disease, gastroenteritis and malaria.

Regarding drugs and medical supplies, patients were, at best, offered doses lower than what would be required by their health conditions. In 1989, the Ministry of Health (MOH) spent over US$500 million in foreign exchange for required imports for the health sector. The breakdown of the previous figure was as follows:

- 360 million dollars for imported pharmaceuticals, vaccines, medical appliances and disposable supplies;

- 100 million dollars for raw materials for Samara Drug Industries which supplied 30% of the needs;

- 30 million dollars for replacement parts and maintenance of health services equipment; and

- 10 million dollars for ambulances and logistical vehicles.

The local currency component for operating the health care system in 1989 was estimated to represent at least double (approximately 1.0 billion dollars).

As at 31 January 2003, The WHO reports that since the start of SCR 986:

+ US$ 2.139 billion of Phases I – XII medicines, medical supplies and equipment had arrived in Iraq;

+ US$ 1.735 billion had been distributed (81.11 %); and

+ US$ 404.1 million represents the storage of medical stocks in Government warehouses (18.89 %).

The breakdown of stocks in storage with regard to all arrivals was: 10.03 % buffer stock; 6.75 % items in quality control; 1.4 % awaiting distribution (working stock); 0.4 % failed quality control/defective; and 0.31 % lacking complementary items/lacking spares or installation capacity.

As a result of the destruction of the 1991 war on Iraq and the 13 years of the genocidal sanction all health statistics reflected these adverse effects 

  • Life Expectancy at Birth in Iraq declined from 63.9 years (1990) to 58 years (1995). [28]
  • Infant Mortality Rate in Iraq increased from 61.7 (1990) to 129 per 1000 live Birth (1995)[29] and dropped to 107.9 (1999)[30]
  • Maternal Mortality Rate in Iraq increased from 117 (1990) to 294 (1999) per 100,000 live births.[31]
  • Reported Number of Deliveries in Government Hospitals in Iraq dropped from 580,000 (1990) to 231,000 in 1998[32]
  • Under 5 mortality Rate in Iraq increased from 30.2 (1989)[33] to 130.6 (1999)[34]
  • Reported Acute Respiratory Infection Prevalence per 10,000 Population Under 5 in Iraq increased from 5,708 (1990) to 6,650 (1998)[35]
  • Reported Diarrhea Cases per 10,000 Under 5 in Iraq increased from 3620 (1990) to 3,912 (1998)[36] .
  • Reported Diarrhea Case Fatality per 1,000 in Iraq increased from 1.6 (1990) to 19.3 (1998)[37]
  • Reported Cases of Tuberculosis in Iraq increased from 14,735 (1990)  to a peak of 29,897 (1999) then dropped to 11.413
  • Reported Acute Respiratory Fatality Rate per 1,000 cases in Iraq increased from 1.06 (1990) to 11.74 (1998)[38]
  • Reported Cases of Mental/Psychological Disorders from Outpatient/Health Attendance in Iraq increased from 197,000 (1990) to 507,000 (1998)[39]
  • Reported Number of outpatient and Health center Consultations in Iraq increased from 36,000,000 (1990) to 79,000,000 (1998)[40]

Water and Sanitation

After the 1991 war, the first United Nations visitor mission to Iraq reported that prior to the war “Baghdad received about 450 litres per person supplied by seven treatment stations purifying water from the Tigris River. The rest of the country had about 200-250 litres per person per day, purified and supplied by 238 central water treatment stations and 1,134 smaller water projects”.[41]

The US deliberately bombed most of the water treatment plants despite the fact that this bombing would lead to massive deterioration in the health condition of the civilian population.[42] To compound the problem, electricity generating plants were also bombed, which badly affected water treatment. It is known that the “[W]ater and sanitation system depends on electrical supply. In 1991 air strikes destroyed much of the country’s power supply, disrupting these basic civilian services”[43].

Great efforts were made to restore the water and sanitation services over the 13 years of sanctions. These efforts were frustrated by the large number of contracts that were placed on hold by the US delegation at the UN 661 committee. At one time nearly 50% of the contracts for water and sewage treatment were placed on hold. According to a letter written by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on October 23, 1999: The representative of Save the Children wrote, ”There is a high level of holds on applications ... for telecommunications (100 per cent), electricity (65.5 per cent), water and sanitation (53.4 per cent) and oil spare parts and equipment (43 per cent)”.[44]

Even essential and badly needed items such as water testing equipment were blocked. Save the Children stated "There has been an attempt to map the water supply [in Iraq] and one of the needs that was paramount was water testing equipment….field test water quality equipment would be extremely difficult if not impossible to pass through the Sanctions Committee because in fact it essentially tests for the chemical constituents of water and the biological aspects and in fact it has a biological incubator built into it.”[45]

The sanctions, coupled with contracts being placed on hold contributed to the deterioration of clean water supply to the civilian population. “While piped water reaches most urban homes, 65 per cent of it is not treated (Oxfam, January 23, 2003). In rural parts of central and southern Iraq, UNICEF now reports that only 45.7 per cent of homes have piped water, compared with 75 per cent before the 1991 Gulf War.”[46] Although most water treatment plants have their own generators, 70 per cent of them do not work, according to UNICEF.

The UNDP reports (December 11, 2002) “Each day, 500,000 tonnes of raw sewage are discharged into the Dyala River and flows into the Tigris. The treatment plants, now operating at half their capacity, were designed to serve the entire population of Baghdad -- nearly six million inhabitants”.[47]


For over a decade, the U.S. military has coated its armor-piercing missiles in depleted uranium (DU), a toxic and radioactive metal. Many scientists and observers attribute the mysterious Gulf War Syndrome among U.S. soldiers and the rapid increase of cancer in southern Iraq to the use of DU.[48] For example, the number of serious childbirth defects in Basra has increased sevenfold since 1991.[49]

It was estimated that 350 to 800 tons of weaponry was used during the 1991 war. The weapons were mostly used in the less inhabited areas around the southern city of Basra.  Iraqi doctors working in Basra have reported an alarming increase in  the incidence of malignancy among children: 3.98/100000 in 1990 to 7.8/100000 in 1995, and 10.7/100000 in 1999 and 13/100000 in 2000. This trend fulfills time sequence criterion whereby the outcome follows a latency period of almost 4 years following exposure to depleted uranium.[50] A recent study found US soldiers who are still contaminated with depleted uranium 12 years after the end of the 1991 Gulf War.[51] A British veteran won a hotly contested disability appeal due to his contamination with DU.[52]

The Pentagon estimates that U.S. and British forces used 1,100 to 2,200 tons of weaponry made from DU during the March 2003 bombing campaign.[53] Moreover, whereas during the first Gulf War much of the DU was dropped on desert battlefields, in 2003 the vast majority of the toxic weapons were deployed in heavily populated urban areas such as Baghdad.[54]

The UN Environment Programme Study, published in March 2003, found DU in air and groundwater in Bosnia-Herzegovina seven years after the weapons were fired. It recommended collecting DU fragments, covering contaminated points with asphalt or clean soil, and keeping records of contaminated sites.[55]

The British Ministry of Defence has issued cards to troops deployed to Iraq, warning that they may have been exposed to depleted uranium dust and offering uranium testing.[56] No warning or information was provided to the people of Iraq to maximize the chance of protecting themselves.

The US Government has declined to take its responsibility to clean up the Iraqi environment from the DU fragments scattered throughout the country. The US says it has no plans to remove the debris left over from depleted uranium (DU) weapons it is using in Iraq.[57]

The increase in the amount of DU used and the fact that it was used in and around more heavily populated centers would result in much greater number of people being exposed to DU effects. It will take another 4 years for such effects to show up.


[1] John M. Broder, “Iraqi Army Toll a Mystery Because No Count is Kept,” New York Times, April

2, 2003.

[2] Daniel Cooney and Omar Sinan, “Iraq Morgue Records: More than 5,500 Killed.” Associated

Press, May 24, 2004. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-


[3] AP Newsbreak: “Iraq's Health Ministry ordered to stop counting civilian dead from war” Available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2003/12/10/international1027EST0569.DTL

[4] Iraq Body Count. Most recent figures available at: http//:www.iraqbodycount.net

[5] “Continuing Collateral Damage: The Health and Environmental Costs of the War,” MedAct,

November 11, 2003. Available at: http://www.medact.org/tbx/docs/Coll%20Dam%202.pdf

[6] Carl Conetta, “The Wages of War: Iraqi Combatant and Noncombatant Fatalities in the 2003

Conflict,” PDA Research Monograph #8, October 28, 2003. Available at:


[7] Rahul Mahajan, “Report from Fallujah—Destroying a Town in Order to ‘Save’ It,”

EmpireNotes.org, April 12, 2004. Available at: http://www.empirenotes.org/fallujah.html

[8] Fallujah Death Toll for Week More Than 600,” Associated Press, April 11, 2004. Available at:


[10] Rumsfeld on looting in Iraq: 'Stuff happens' Available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/04/11/sprj.irq.pentagon/

[11] Suzanne Goldenberg, “Iraq: A Land Ruled by Chaos,” Guardian, October 4, 2003. Available at:


[12]  Niko Price, “Crime Wave in Iraqi Capital Unprecedented,” Associated Press, August 7, 2003.

[13] Daniel Cooney and Omar Sinan. “Iraq Morgue Records: More than 5,500 Killed.” Associated

Press, May 24, 2004. Available at:


[14] “Iraqi Police: Najaf wasn’t prepared for officers,” CNN, June 1, 2004. Available at:


[15] REBUILDING IRAQ, Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues. Available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04902r.pdf

[16] Jim Krane, “U.S. General: Iraq Police Training a Flop,” Associated Press, June 9, 2004. Available

at: http://apnews.myway.com/article/20040610/D833T1B80.html

[17] http://www.casi.org.uk/info/unelecsecwg011120.pdf

[18] [NEJM 1991] The Harvard Study Team.  "The effect of the Gulf crisis on the children of Iraq", New England Journal of Medicine, 325 pp. 977 - 980. 199

[19] http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports/bvsnov17.html

[20] Matt Kelley, “Fewer Iraqis Working on Reconstruction,” Associated Press, May 18, 2004

[21] Coalition Provisional Authority, “Administrator’s Weekly Report, Essential Services”, September

21st-27th.” Available at:


[22] Ibid.

[23] Maureen Fan and Drew Brown, “U.S. Appears to be Losing Battle for Hearts, Minds of Many

Iraqis,” Knight-Ridder, November 13, 2003. Available at:


[24] Coalition Provisional Authority, “Administrator’s Weekly Report, Essential Services”, September

21st-27th.” Available at:


[25] Matt Kelley, “Fewer Iraqis Working on Reconstruction,” Associated Press, May 18, 2004

[26]U.S. has spent fraction of Iraq rebuilding funds” Available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/02/money.rebuilding.ap/index.html

[27] www.who.int/disasters/repo/10062.pdf

[28] Source: Human Development Report and UN Sources.

[29] Source: Human Development Report 1995 and Report of the Second Panel Concerning the Humanitarian

Situation in Iraq, 30 January 1999.

[30] Maternal and under 5 Children Mortality Survey, 1999.

[31] Human Development Report 1995, UNICEF and Report of the Second Panel Concerning the

Humanitarian Situation in Iraq, 30 January 1999.

[32] WHO

[33] Source: Report of the Second Panel Concerning the Humanitarian Situation in Iraq, 30 January 1999.

[34] Maternal and under 5 Children Mortality Survey, 1999.

[35] WHO

[36] WHO

[37] WHO

[38] WHO

[39] WHO

[40] WHO

[41] Report on humanitarian needs in Iraq in the immediate post-crisis environment by a mission to the area led by the Under-Secretary- General for Administration and Management, 10- 17 March 1991 Available at: http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/s22366.html#h20

[42] Nagy

[43] Oxfam Iraq: On the Brink of Disaster

[44] http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/reports/sg991086.pdf

[45] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmintdev/67/6702.htm

[46] Alleviating Poverty in Iraq, UNDP Iraq 2002

[47] Iraq repairs sewage plants serving millions in Baghdad Available At http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/56c3caa14394c9b185256c8c006c876d?OpenDocument

[48] Campaign Against Depleted Uranium. Available at: http://www.cadu.org.uk

[49] Nigel Morris, “Rise in Birth Deformities Blamed on Allies’ Deadly Weaponry,” The Independent,

May 13, 2004. Available at:


[50] www.uraniumweaponsconference.de/ speakers/yacoub_evidence.pdf

[51] http://currents.ucsc.edu/03-04/01-19/uranium.html

[52] http://www.traprockpeace.org/schott_12feb04.html

[53] Larry Johnson, “War’s Unintended Effects; Use of Depleted Uranium Weapons Lingers as Health

Concern,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, August 4, 2003. Available at:


[54] Ibid

[55] US rejects Iraq DU clean-up  http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/sci/tech/2946715.stm

[56]  See http://www.traprockpeace.org/du_mod_warning_cards.html

[57] US rejects Iraq DU clean-up  http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/sci/tech/2946715.stm


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