Two weeks in China: Impressions of a traveler

By Manuel Raposo
May 12, 2026

May 7, 2026

Raposo is an editor of the Portuguese language Marxist web magazine, Mudar de Vida (Change of Life) — jornalmudardevida.net. Translation: John Catalinotto

For ordinary Europeans of the 16th century, China — “the proud empire of which we hear so much” (Camões, the Portuguese poet) — could be little more than a strange and inaccessible world. It was known only to the merchant-navigators who made the round trip in 2-to–3 years, enduring countless hardships, fatal for most of the crew members, most of whom were conscripted or lured by the mirage of adventure and fortune. Only the elites could enjoy the fine porcelain (the “white gold”) and exquisite silk that filled the ships’ holds. Beyond that, the land of the Chins was a land of fable.

Contemporary China is well known throughout the world and to everyone. With the Chinese restaurant that outshines any fast-food joint, the “Chinese” store that sells everything to everyone, the ubiquitous “Made in China” clothing, the cheapest cell phones and computers, the electric cars that are sweeping European manufacturers aside, the state-of-the-art solar panels and the silent Chinese capital that challenges established monopolies — whether visibly or not — China has permeated our Western world. And it is shaking the seemingly impregnable dominance of Europeans and North Americans in every aspect of global life, from the economic to the cultural.

What is the driving force behind such a transformation in the span of just two generations, to the point that the distant and legendary China has become our daily companion? To the point that our destinies and theirs have become inseparable?

Fifteen days are not enough to get to know a country, much less China in all its scope and diversity. But they are enough, even so, to see up close what this “magnificent empire” — now built by 1.4 billion souls — is all about and to gauge what a social revolution, rooted in the will and sacrifices of the poorest, has been able to transform in 70 years. They are enough to try to dispel myths and reflect on the shared future that, inevitably, we all have with China.

Everything is organized

Lots and lots of people everywhere, but there is no pushing and shoving (even though they don’t respect lines). In the greater East — India, Vietnam — you don’t see dozens of people on the street; no, it’s always hundreds or thousands. But unlike in India, in China everything seems to run smoothly.

The cities are colossal in size and population. Beijing covers an area of 16,000 km² (6,400 sq. miles — bigger than all of Connecticut) and has 22 million residents. Many millions more commute back and forth during the day.

Small cities like Guilin have 5 million inhabitants. Xi’an has 9 million. Guangzhou, with 18 million, is China’s fifth-largest city. The Guangzhou-Shenzhen metropolitan area, one of the country’s main industrial zones, has 36 million.

The urban population is approaching 70% of the total, more than 950 million people. The conditions for chaos would be present were it not for rigorous urban planning across all its aspects (housing, transportation, infrastructure, public facilities, commerce, social services, environment) and a self-imposed discipline by the population.

Comparison

From what I have seen in China and Vietnam (and also in Iran), each person’s social behavior contributes to a collective order that would otherwise be impossible to maintain. The need for order dictated by large numbers, as in a large family, likely contributes to this gregarious behavior — which, in any case, has nothing to do with militarism or herd mentality. In India, however, with a population equal to that of China, chaos is the norm; everyone has to fend for themselves, because there is no entity to look out for everyone.

Although the Chinese are far from being arrogant, they are not at all submissive. Nevertheless, reports by 19th- and 20th-century colonialists treated Indian and Chinese manual laborers as people without pride. In India, the poorest people who wander the streets after foreigners bow in the hope of a coin or some service, seeming to confirm the colonizers’ prejudice.

No signs of submission are visible in China or Vietnam. To what extent did the revolution in China and Vietnam, by mobilizing the masses of the poor and lifting millions out of poverty, also contribute to creating a sense of community and individual pride that is not seen in India? To what extent did Mao and Ho Chi Minh surpass Gandhi? To what extent did the war of liberation — not pacifism — temper the national spirit?

Extensive employment

Many young people are working in all kinds of jobs, public or private. Older people (some of whom may be retired) also work in various public service roles: sweeping sidewalks and squares, tending gardens, assisting the elderly and disabled in public spaces and supporting museum visitors.

Women retire at 50 or 55 (depending on the job) and men at 60. This implies a renewal of the workforce — not only in terms of age but also in terms of qualifications. Younger people are generally better educated, especially in skills related to new technologies, which accelerates development. The aim of putting everyone to work seems clear: everyone contributes, everyone has a salary, no one begs, no one is a parasite.

The flip side: early retirement means higher social security costs for the state. The aging population has led to changes, starting in 2025, to the retirement ages that had been in place since 1978. By 2040, the retirement age will gradually rise to 63 (for men) and 55 or 58 (for women).

Enjoy

Everyone seems well-fed. Rice and pasta, vegetables, meat and fish — in the proportions typical of Asian diets and in a wide variety — appear to be plentiful.

The younger generations, young adults aged 18 to 25, are taller than their parents or grandparents, a sign of better nutrition and medical care.

Clothing and footwear for the world

Everyone is well-dressed and well-shod, whether in the cold of Beijing or Xi’an or in the mild temperatures of the South. The clothing resembles what we see here, and no wonder — it is the Chinese who supply us with the bulk of our clothing and footwear. China produces two out of every three pairs of shoes (13 billion per year) and more than 40% of the world’s clothing. The current focus of research is on smart, recyclable and sustainable fabrics. China wants to move beyond being merely the “world’s factory” to become the “world’s cutting-edge factory” through its capacity for innovation. Incidentally, Asia, largely driven by China, accounts for 90% of this production of clothing.

No Change

Physical cash is practically nonexistent. All payments are made digitally via smartphone. Every shop, restaurant or simple street stall displays a QR code through which everything is paid for. Three-quarters of all transactions are made this way, especially in urban areas, by more than 950 million people.

The minimum wage is set regionally, based on the level of development. It ranges from 3,000 to 2,000 yuan, roughly speaking. Labor demand has been driving these figures upward. In 2024, the average monthly wage in urban areas was between 10,000 and 13,000 yuan. The monthly cost of living in Shanghai was 5,000 yuan. The public sector pays, on average, significantly more than the private sector.

In Beijing, a full meal (rice, vegetables, meat or fish) at a restaurant can cost between 15 and 30 yuan. A large bowl of soup with noodles (which have been used for 4,000 years), vegetables and meat or fish, or street food, which is very common, costs even less. It is assumed that meals prepared at home are even cheaper. A metro ticket in Beijing costs between 3 and 6 yuan, up to 10 yuan for long distances.

Prices are lower in smaller cities and rural areas.

7 x 1.4 billion

Recent news (February 2026): during the Lunar New Year, the Chinese made 9.4 billion domestic trips, an average of 7 per person. Only a flawless public transportation system can ensure such mobility, not only within cities and their suburbs but also between cities.

China has the world’s largest and fastest high-speed rail network: 50,000 km (31,000 miles), accounting for 70% of high-speed rail worldwide. Trains travel at 350 km/h, without swaying or noise, at affordable prices. Even on urban metro systems, speeds easily reach 150 km/h (93 mph) without compromising comfort. Everything — stations, trains, signage — is new, spacious, clean and efficient. This high mobility ensures that the movement of labor and goods faces no obstacles. It is a key aspect of the extent and effectiveness of China’s domestic market.

The entire rail network is built on elevated tracks. This conserves land (particularly important for arable land, which is scarce in China) and preserves existing road connections. Research is underway to increase speeds to 450 km/h (already achieved in Shanghai). Looking ahead, speeds of 1,000 km/h (610 mph) are envisioned to compete with air travel, with clear energy and environmental benefits.

Reflection: The train is socialist. The private car (by the thousands) is capitalist. And bicycles and motorcycles, also by the thousands? — they remain for now in limbo, perhaps in a border zone between socialist collectivism and individualism, which can also be socialist. The Communist Manifesto states that the free development of each individual is a condition for the development of the whole. The future will tell.

Hukou

Internal migration tends to be massive, especially from rural areas to major industrial centers. There is an official residence registration system (hukou) that determines citizens’ access to social services in their region of origin. Anyone can move wherever they want, but they are subject to restrictions regarding the full use of social services.

The system helps control labor mobility and demographic imbalances. It alleviates pressure on the housing stock (which, as we well know, tends to create run-down neighborhoods and overcrowding) and prevents the overburdening of public services (such as health and education) in areas that attract large populations, such as major urban centers.

The system also prevents the depopulation of rural inland areas. But in this case, what matters is not just the administrative measure itself: The government’s policy of promoting improved living conditions in rural and peripheral regions is the main tool for retaining populations.

Common Ground

We failed to get acquainted with rural areas, where living conditions differ from those in large urban centers. We have only glimpsed them during longer train journeys. One thing stands out: the same concern for preserving agricultural land. China has nearly 20% of the world’s population and less than 10% of the planet’s arable land. The preservation of agricultural production — including the reclamation of less fertile soils and the application of cutting-edge scientific and technological processes — is crucial.

Next to clusters of traditional village houses, it is common to see residential buildings of 10 – 15 stories or more, squeezed into small spaces. Further on, in an equally confined area, factory facilities. All around, cultivated fields, usually extensive, which indicates collective labor and mechanization. Most likely, a greater concentration of workers resulting from the creation of a local industry or an agro-industrial zone necessitates the construction of high-rise housing to preserve the best land.

There is no private land ownership. The tradition, which remains in place, is one of public ownership of urban and rural land, now managed by the state, local governments and village communities, the communes. Rights of use — for housing, commerce or industry — are granted for fixed, renewable periods. Foreigners may buy a home provided they study or work in China but not for rental or speculation. (There are no golden visas here [Visas that people with wealth can purchase].)

800 million fewer

You don’t see poverty like in the West. Social differences aren’t glaringly obvious. Nothing is comparable to the shocking contrasts of India or the shantytowns of European, South American, African or North American metropolises. There are no Talude or Covas da Moura neighborhoods, no favelas, no tents under bridges.

You don’t see houseless people. One of the measures to combat poverty was the construction of millions of public housing units for low-income families. Alongside this, urban management is strict.

The hukou system helps balance rural-urban dynamics. Ninety percent of Chinese families own their own homes. China has achieved a feat unique in human history — lifting 800 to 850 million people out of poverty in 40 years. It eradicated absolute poverty by meeting U.N. targets a full decade ahead of schedule.

But some regions are poorer than others, as the disparity in minimum wages indicates. Even in urban areas, such as an old district of Guangzhou, there are aging houses, some dilapidated, but they are a remnant of the past — an island now visited as a tourist curiosity, where relics of the past, such as portraits of Mao, are sold in a flea market-style setting. All around, new high-rise buildings have sprung up. In an alleyway, a red cloth banner with a notice from the “parish council” about proper waste disposal and fire prevention. Public services function. The sense of security, day or night, is absolute.

Who is responsible for the bad atmosphere?

In a conversation with A.C., who lived in China for many years, we discussed Beijing’s air pollution, in particular. Years ago, he said, there were days when you couldn’t open the window at home and could barely see across the street. Today’s situation is completely different, judging by the cities we visited. Policies to control urban and industrial pollution (the “battle for blue skies”) have proven effective: a drastic reduction in coal use, an increase in electric transportation, the production and use of clean energy, air purification systems in cities and the closure of industries in urban areas.

But there is one side of the issue that Western critics tend to omit. The fact that China has become the world’s factory has led to an exponential increase in its environmental crisis. Much of the polluting production facilities that existed for centuries in the West were transferred to China by European and North American capital starting in the 1980s.

The West rid itself of a large part of its environmental problems by transferring them to the Global South, while continuing to benefit from goods produced elsewhere — and at a much lower cost, to boot. It is therefore perfectly legitimate to hold Europe and the U.S. accountable for their share of the environmental pollution that the Chinese have endured for decades to ease the financial burden and protect the lungs of Westerners.

(One of the world’s biggest polluters is the U.S. military, which refuses to provide data on the matter, citing “security reasons.” Trump has further reduced regulatory controls, eliminating limits on pollutant emissions and encouraging the use of fossil fuels.)

Giant size

Everything is on an extraordinary scale. Not just the population, not just the many centuries of virtually continuous civilization. Not just the size or grandeur of the works, but above all their persistence over time and what appears to be an extraordinary foresight — the ability to see projects through to the end, projects that last millennia, spanning generation after generation — even though the pioneering generations could not be certain of the work’s continuity. Or could they?

The Great Wall, north of Beijing, is a classic and obvious example. More than 21,000 kilometers (13,000 miles) of walls, of colossal scale, built by successive dynasties from the 7th century B.C. up to the 17th century, with the aim of halting the nomads of Siberia and Mongolia. How many thousands of hands, how many lashes, how many millions of stone blocks hewn and laid with precision, how many millions of cubic yards of earth?

Another example — in a certain sense even more impressive given its purpose of unifying China — is the Grand Canal, which runs from south to north, stretching from Hangzhou to the outskirts of Beijing, over nearly 1,800 km (1,300 miles). Constructed over a thousand years, it was begun in the 5th century B.C., over 2,500 years ago (the Romans had not yet reached Lusitania) and completed in the 14th century.

Public works — for that is what they are — have an unparalleled history in China — yesterday and today. Only a centralized power, with full ownership of the land (and the strength to collect taxes), could carry them out; and only that could guarantee the survival of so many millions of people. The story continues, under different conditions.

Outside the world of the living

But there is another case, recently discovered, that haunts the mind: the Terracotta Army of Xi’an. This is not a public works project. China’s first emperor, Qin Shi Huang (3rd century B.C.), had himself buried surrounded by 8,000 terracotta warriors — generals and soldiers — 130 chariots, 500 horses, along with government officials, acrobats, musicians and even rare animals — all life-sized — to ensure he was well-defended and well-served in the afterlife.

For nearly 40 years, 700,000 workers and artists carried out the work, which would ultimately be completely buried. The ritual resembles that of the Egyptian mastabas and pyramids or that of the tombs of the Persian emperors in Pars (a ceremonial city that the Greeks called Persepolis and destroyed in their anger), carved into hard rock. But while these immortalized, in the eyes of the living and in the permanence of stone, the presence of imperial power beyond death, Emperor Qin, strangely, consigned himself to an underground eternity unknown to the living. It was not until 1974 that humble Chinese farmers, while digging a well, unearthed Qin and his finished world, 2,000 years later.

In a flash

Thousands of Chinese flock ritually to Mao Zedong’s mausoleum, enduring hours of waiting in tight lines, in sun or rain, to see, for a few seconds, an embalmed body guarded by living soldiers standing at strict attention. (The same in Moscow at Lenin’s mausoleum.) It is a cult unworthy of our age of rationalism, secularism, science and progress — an age that created the material conditions to cast all idols down from the altar.

Only out of nostalgia or illusion can the Chinese of today (or the Russians) see in the body of Mao (or Lenin) the permanence of the revolutionary power of 1949 (or 1917). Thanks to the revolution, China (like Russia) will not return to the servitude from which it emerged at the cost of millions of deaths and rivers of sweat. That is the enduring legacy of Mao (and Lenin). But today’s reality is different; dead bodies are preserved and their cult promoted to obscure the differences. There is a certain prescience in Qin’s underground modesty.

Mao at the CCP Museum

At the Chinese Communist Party Museum in Beijing, Mao is the central figure. It could not be otherwise. The heroic or dramatic stages of the CCP’s history are all present in the exhibition’s chronology, which is profusely documented, illustrated and staged. But a careful eye can discern the political meaning that today’s China attaches to the party’s journey, from its origins to the present, and the place it reserves for its greatest symbol. Two moments to note:

Shanghai, 1927. The Kuomintang is treated leniently. The Shanghai Betrayal (the massacre of communists at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists) is framed in terms of “certain elements” of the KMT who violated the alliance with the CCP, and “deviations” by CCP members misled by the KMT. Is this merely diplomacy regarding Taiwan, where the KMT has a significant political presence, or is there something deeper at play?

The turning point, 1976 – 78. There is a crucial moment in the history of revolutionary China: the period from 1976 to 1978, following Mao’s death.

Mao, the patron of the new China, a country freed from a hundred years of humiliation, gave way to a “realist” Deng Xiaoping, the man who embraced the “necessary” change, the creator of modern China. As if it had been an obvious and smooth transition. It was not so.

The leaders of the Cultural Revolution (derided as the Gang of Four) were treated as criminals. In fact, they represented the party’s left wing and enjoyed Mao’s protection. Their summary elimination (imprisoned shortly after Mao’s death and sentenced in 1980) paved the way for Deng’s hegemony and his “Reform and Opening Up” program of 1978. That marked the full-scale entry of foreign capital into China. During the years of the Cultural Revolution, Deng was removed twice from positions of responsibility at Mao’s behest.

China’s undeniable successes since then allow the current leadership to erase the political issue of the transition that took place in 1976 – 78. Mao has become a ritual figure, a saint on the altar. Deng is the worker. This is expressed, without restraint, in an exhibition in Shenzhen commemorating the 40th anniversary (1978 – 2018) of “Reform and Opening Up.”

Deng ousts Mao

It was in Shenzhen, once a small fishing village, that today’s China took off. The dizzying story of Shenzhen’s transformation into one of the world’s leading industrial hubs is an example of how China does in 10 years what the West does in 100.

The exhibition is impressive for its educational value and its narrative. From an essentially rural and poor China to today’s developed China, the world’s largest economic power when measured in terms of purchasing power parity. From the primitive agricultural machinery, mechanical looms and plastic tools of the early industrialization era, through the first computers and radio sets, to the space stations and urban development of today.

Plan, execute

In parallel, in the same exhibition center, a comprehensive display of the urban planning that accompanied Shenzhen’s growth. How does a town grow, in 40 years, from a small fishing village to an industrial metropolis of 18 million people, ensuring living conditions in all their aspects?

The explanation is provided both in large-scale territorial plans and in detailed plans, illustrated with maps and models. Overall impression: Planning seems to precede physical growth; the plans correspond to what can be seen on the ground (roads, transportation, residential or industrial areas, green spaces, recreation, culture, sports, infrastructure, public services … ). They are not mere blueprints of intentions; they are the basis for action.

Staying ahead, in this case, means planning meticulously, implementing on time, ensuring permanent multidisciplinary teams, keeping pace with physical growth over the years, listening to communities, correcting errors and deviations, adapting plans to new realities, refusing to yield to pressures and shortcuts, stimulating private capital but keeping its impulses on a tight leash.

Jin speaks proudly of the emergency hospitals built at the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic. Field hospitals with hundreds of beds and equipment were erected in ten days. “When it needs to be done, we really do it!”

C.W., a German architect who has worked in China on several occasions, confirms: Organization, discipline, competence, high qualifications and everyone’s commitment. In the work teams, there is no distinction between workers and managers. “In Germany, we wouldn’t be able to get a hospital like that up and running even in months.”

15th Five-Year Plan

A new direction for China’s economy and social development? The plenary session of the CPC Central Committee in mid-October received extensive coverage on television. This has the makings of a strategic shift. It concerns the upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan for 2026 – 2030. The focus, in terms of public information, is on three topics: 1) economic development based on an increase in quality, not just quantity; 2) boosting domestic consumption; 3) promoting “Beautiful China.”

It is a response to the global situation. China seeks to transition from being a major global producer of everything in large quantities — largely dependent on exports to major Western markets — to becoming a major global supplier of quality products and services, of everything that is technologically advanced, thereby adding value to its domestic and foreign trade.

Stimulating domestic consumption (1.4 billion people represent the world’s largest potential market) is necessary to find an outlet for colossal production, especially as the decline of the West threatens to shrink European and North American markets. This strategy requires increasing purchasing power and, consequently, the standard of living of the Chinese people.

Around the same time, on Oct. 26, 2026, the ASEAN summit in Malaysia (eleven countries with a market of 700 million people, in addition to the 1.4 billion Chinese) signed a free trade agreement with China. It was an initial response to Trump’s tariffs, leaving the U.S. by the wayside.

The first quarter of 2026 appears to confirm the plan’s intent. China’s GDP grew by 5% (with the industrial sector standing out at 6.1%), with an annual forecast of 4.4% to 5%. Lagging behind are the U.S. (2.3% to 2.4%), the European Union (0.9%) and the global average (3.1% to 3.3%).

China remains the engine of the global economy. But the outlook for the coming decades raises questions. Population decline, slowing productivity growth and falling profit rates — ailments from which the West suffers chronically — will also affect the Chinese economy by mid-century. In the long run, no form of capitalism, public or private, escapes decline. Hence its historical limits.

Questions

Harmony or Counterpoint? The “harmony” between private capital and public (state) capital — as the CCP and the government seek to present the coexistence of the two systems — is, in reality, more of a contradiction between the public-social sector and the private sector. What is the main driving force in this duality: private capital or the state-social sector? The future shape of China will depend on the interplay of this contradiction.

Yin Yang (the harmony of opposites, according to Taoism) is an appealing concept, but it does not work with capitalism. … There are no eternal balances. Perhaps Taoism lacks a bit of dialectics. Mao’s acumen — he was a master at identifying the principal contradiction that needed to be resolved at every moment in the history of the revolution — was sidelined by the traditional, pacifying “harmony of opposites.”

The private sector accounts for 60% of GDP, 80% of urban employment and 50% of foreign trade. But state-owned enterprises control the strategic sectors: energy, infrastructure and transportation, telecommunications and digital infrastructure, defense and cutting-edge technology, banking and finance, natural resources, raw materials and agriculture.

As long as the state dominates economic planning, foreign relations, land ownership, finance, and strategic sectors, it will be difficult for private capital to steer the country’s development in its own way (chaotic, individualistic, to the detriment of the collective). But the tension between these two poles cannot remain forever in the balance that seems to exist now: the contradiction will have to be resolved by one side overcoming the other.

What fate awaits so many proletarians? Chinese society is highly proletarianized. In a working-age population, aged 15 to 59, of about 730 million (2025), the vast majority — 560 million, more than three-quarters — are wage earners, in the private sector or in state-owned enterprises. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions has 300 million members.

How can today’s Chinese society, now fully proletarian, resolve that contradiction in favor of the working masses? What role will the peasantry play in this process? (It would be better to say the rural population, since the land is collectively owned by rural communes and local governments and not by individual peasants.)

A classic, democratic agrarian reform, with the distribution of land to individual peasants, is a thing of the past. The degree of socialization and industrialization of peasant production already achieved points toward an even greater degree of socialization, not a regression toward individual production. The rural population, less than 35% of the total population, is essentially proletarianized.

It is possible that the population actually engaged in agricultural production is much smaller, since many of the migrants flocking to urban and industrialized areas remain officially registered as rural residents under the hukou system. Furthermore, much of the economic activity in rural areas is of an industrial or agro-industrial nature.

And what role will the growing class of service workers play? Which side will it take? Data from 2024 indicate that agriculture accounts for 22% of the labor force (compared to nearly 37% in 2010), industry for 29% and the service sector for 49%.

So far, it is clear that the five-year plans have effectively served China’s material development, both private capitalist and state-socialist. Wages have risen consistently, and the cost of living remains stable or low. In 2025, the consumer price index remained unchanged, food costs fell by 1.5%, and housing costs fell by 5.7%. Core inflation (excluding food and energy) rose by 0.7%.

The steady improvement in living conditions for the population across all strata (despite growing inequalities) reinforces popular confidence in the state and the CCP. But the widening social gap that has been observed shows that an upper stratum (bourgeois, of course) benefits more from China’s rapid growth than the working classes who create the wealth. An indelible mark of capitalist dynamics. How long can this tightrope walk continue?

Socialism or the “old quagmire”? The CCP’s commitment, with the recent 15th Five-Year Plan, to “quality development” aims to elevate these improvements to a higher level: health, environment, schools, transportation, communications, automation, housing, leisure, tourism, etc. The effort to level the playing field between rural and urban-industrial regions seeks to counter capitalism’s inherent tendency toward unequal development. The fight against corruption and strict state regulation tempers the impulses of large private capital, both domestic and foreign.

A crucial question, however, will be whether this translates into (a) a reversal of the trend toward increasing inequalities, (b) a reduction in compulsory working hours, (c) the parallel creation of free and higher-level work — not merely leisure — for the general population freed from compulsory labor.

Free and higher-level work will mean: research, science, technology, art, culture and everything that the blinders of the capitalist society in which we are immersed do not allow us to anticipate. Work as human fulfillment.

Will this be one of the unmistakable signs of progress toward socialism or, conversely, of the persistence — even if at a higher level of wealth — of the “old capitalist quagmire” of which Karl Marx spoke? That quagmire, which Marx feared would be reproduced even in a revolutionary society due to material scarcity, can also be reproduced, as we can clearly see today, in societies of material abundance when conditions of social equality are lacking.

The emphasis in Chinese plans on boosting domestic tourism, for example, raises the question of whether the reduction in working hours will merely fuel yet another industry — tourism and related sectors, the entertainment industry and the “distraction” industry — in a manner similar to what occurs in the capitalist West.

The mass production of electric cars raises similar questions. Here’s why: the environmental issue that first arises in this case lies with the private car, not the internal combustion engine. Replacing diesel, gasoline or biofuel with electricity fails to address the fundamental issue (avoided by most environmentalists), which is the “pollution” of urban life resulting from the proliferation of private cars (parking, traffic jams, inevitable harm to public transportation, waste of electricity, the need for more demanding roads and infrastructure, etc.). The individual happiness of owning “my” car translates into the collective unhappiness of everyone, including “me.” This is the blind logic that guides capitalism.

A second revolution? Will this transformation of social relations be possible before the imperialist world is dismantled? Will it be possible without a second revolution? What form will it take?

The recent attempt by Jack Ma (the Alibaba tycoon and his tentacles, the Ant Group) to force China’s opening to financial speculation was thwarted by the stern intervention of the CCP and the state. But the case revealed three things: 1) the considerable power of Chinese private capitalism, which demands full freedom for financial-speculative activity (undoubtedly due to the enormous volume of fictitious capital it has created); 2) capital accumulation may, in certain economic sectors, be reaching the limits of development permitted by productive activity due to market availability (excess accumulated capital finds no productive outlet and tends toward speculation); 3) the CCP and the state demonstrated, in this case, the resolve, capacity and strength to curb the pressure toward the financialization of Chinese private capital.

(Ma cultivated business relationships with the U.S. financiers at Goldman Sachs and the Japanese at SoftBank in 1999 and 2000, who helped him create the Alibaba-Ant Group empire. Donald Trump, in 2017 during his first term, received Ma at Trump Tower to discuss business deals or political maneuvers. In 2020, Ant Group, which specialized in a speculative debt economy, attempted a massive financial operation in Hong Kong and Shanghai: an initial public offering (IPO) worth $37 billion in shares. It was backed by major Chinese and international financial firms — from West Asia, the U.S. and Europe. The deal, which had monopolistic overtones, was halted by the intervention of Chinese banking authorities. Alibaba was heavily fined for abuse of its dominant market position, its subsidiaries were spun off, and in 2023, Ma lost control of Ant Group.)

[See WW’s coverage of the struggle involving the Ant Group in this November 2020 article by Sara Flounders: workers.org/2020/11/52640/ ]

However, for this intervention to be effective, it will not suffice to simply place a lid on the pot of private capital, whose expansionist and speculative tendency is, in itself, irrepressible. A transformation of the productive system will be necessary, one that aims to eliminate the role of private capital and its drive for profit.

The replacement of old capital with new capital (cutting-edge technologies, scientific innovations, etc.) will be a way to channel surplus capital into productive use, but it will be a temporary solution and will always lag behind the expanded reproduction of capital, given the pace at which this is occurring in China. A qualitative change will have to stem from an alteration in labor relations, social relations and the (certainly gradual) elimination of the capital-labor wage relationship — the foundation of capitalism — which inevitably shapes social relations in China.

Will the CCP and the state be able to carry out this process? Everything will depend on which social forces prevail in China’s near future. Lingyi Wei and Minqi Li, two Marxist economists from the Chinese New Left, argue that the prospect of capitalism’s historical decline (due to the rate of profit falling to zero) offers China the opportunity to eliminate private capitalism, with society taking on the task of managing a zero-profit economy. Only socialism can do this. In a socially owned economy, they assert, all economic surplus would be appropriated by society as a whole and used for purposes determined by democratic decisions.

Further Reading

“Man’s Fate,” by French novelist André Malraux, 1933. The 1927 Shanghai Uprising, experienced by the author, the Kuomintang’s betrayal and the massacre of the communists; and everything a masterful novel can convey. English translations available from book vendors.

“The Rise of China and the Demise of the Capitalist World Economy,” by Minqi Li, 2008. A book presenting a compelling and well-argued thesis: China’s economic growth is incompatible with the global capitalist system, which will collapse under the pressure of China’s growth. Pluto Press, www.plutobooks.com, available at digamo.free.fr

“China: Imperialism or Semi-Periphery?,” by Minqi Li, 2021. A book based on the Leninist conception of imperialism, it examines the ideas that consider China an imperialist country and demonstrates the practical impossibility — both from an economic and environmental standpoint — of China ever playing this role, in light of the very Leninist notion of imperialism: a minority exploiting a vast majority. Available at monthlyreview.org

“The Making of an Economic Superpower. Unlocking the secret of China’s rapid industrialization,” a book by Yi Wen, 2016. Description and critical assessment of China’s industrialization process until it became the economic power it is today, with an emphasis on the continuous growth of the market. Comparison with the path taken by other industrial powers in the capitalist West. Available from online vendors.

“Legacies of De-financialization and Defending the Real Economy in China,” by He Zhixiong, Sit Tsui and Yan Xiaohui, 2021. How China has combated financial speculation since 1949 — through political, disciplinary and even military means — by putting the interests of the people first. The Jack Ma case is explained in detail. Available at monthlyreview.org

“Surplus Absorption, Secular Stagnation, and the Transition to Socialism: Contradictions of the U.S. and Chinese Economies Since 2000,” by Lingyi Wei and Minqi Li, 2024. The U.S. and China, two examples illustrating the economic contradictions under conditions of secular stagnation and the possibilities for a transition to socialism. Available at monthlyreview.org

Beijing, Xi’an, Guilin, Guangzhou, Shenzhen. October 2025

The numerical and other data presented are available online in open sources.